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NOLLON V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION: THE




Under its police power, a state government' may enact land use reg-
ulations restricting private property uses for the public benefit.2 While
this is a broad power, it is not unlimited. When the state's intrusion
upon a landowner's dominion interest goes "too far,"3 a landowner may
be able to challenge the regulation as a "regulatory taking."4 In a regula-
tory-takings case, the landowner claims that a land use regulation results
in a taking of a valuable property interest and accordingly requires the
state to pay him or her just compensation under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted several tests to
determine when a land use regulation amounts to a regulatory taking.6
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,7 the Court appeared to sug-
gest that a regulatory taking may be established if a land use regulation
fails to "'substantially advance legitimate state interests.' "8
The Court held that where a state imposes a land use condition that
would amount to a taking if imposed outright, the condition must bear
1. This Note is limited to discussion of state power in the land use context and does not
discuss federal power. For a discussion of federal land use power, see I J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.24 (rev. 3d ed. 1988).
2. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's police
power.
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 397 (1922).
4. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for a general discussion of regulatory
takings.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "The fifth amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). The fifth
amendment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
ChiCago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
6. See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
disposition of regulatory takings cases.
7. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan II].
8. Id. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The Court appeared
to suggest that under the facts in Nollan, the failure to establish only the first part of the two-
part Agins test would amount to a taking. Id. at 3150. See infra notes 44-48 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the Agins two-part test.
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an "essential nexus" with a legitimate state purpose in order to be valid.9
The failure of a land use condition to meet the "essential-nexus" require-
ment renders the condition a taking-a taking that can only be accom-
plished through the state's power of eminent domain, along with the
requisite payment of just compensation. 10 Requiring an essential nexus
in such cases ensures that the state cannot seek to obtain by a condition
what it could not obtain outright without resorting to the use of eminent
domain and the requisite payment of just compensation. 1
This Note analyzes Nollan and the future implications of the essen-
tial-nexus test. The Nollan Court failed to explicitly define the scope of
the essential-nexus test for future regulatory-takings cases. If Nollan is
interpreted broadly, all land use regulations may have to satisfy an essen-
tial nexus with a legitimate purpose in order to be valid. This Note, how-
ever, rejects a broad interpretation of Nollan and proposes that the
parameters of Nollan should be construed more narrowly. Under the
proposed reading of Nollan, a land use regulation will only need to sat-
isfy an essential nexus when the state seeks to impose a land use condition
that would amount to a taking if imposed outright. Limiting application
of the essential-nexus test is preferable because applying that standard to
all land use regulations would place an undue burden on the state's abil-
ity to impose land use restrictions.1 The next section briefly reviews
some of the distinctions between the state's power of eminent domain
and its police power.
II. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE STATE'S EMINENT DOMAIN
AND POLICE POWER
State government can directly affect private-property interests
through two distinct powers: 3 (1) the eminent-domain power;1 4 and (2)
9. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
10. Id at 3150. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of eminent
domain.
11. See infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text for discussion of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions.
12. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text for discussion of a narrower interpreta-
tion of Nollan.
13. The state may also affect private property through its power to tax. See 1 J.
SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.41. The power of eminent domain and the power of taxation
have certain characteristics in common.... [B]oth powers (1) originate as an inherent attri-
bute of sovereignty; (2) are generally operative upon property; and (3) may be asserted only for
a public use and to promote the general welfare. Id.
See id. at § 1.41[1]-[4] for further discussion of the state's, taxing power and its effect on
property interests.
14. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text for discussion of eminent domain.
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A "taking" involves a publicly inflicted injury upon a landowner's
property interest, requiring just compensation under the Constitution. 6
Eminent domain empowers a sovereign government to take private prop-
erty for public use without the landowner's consent upon the payment of
just compensation. 7 Under its eminent domain power, the government
initiates legal proceedings to condemn land for public use.' 8 After the
landowner is justly compensated, the property is transferred to the state
for public use and enjoyment. 9
Constitutional provisions requiring just compensation for a taking of
private property limit the power of eminent domain.20 The fifth amend-
ment's guarantee that "[no] ... property [shall] be taken for public use,
without just compensation"'" is, therefore, a limitation, rather than a
source, of eminent-domain power.2 2
Typically, eminent domain occurs when the state needs land for a
public purpose, such as for a road or a sidewalk, and then appropriates
the property for that use.23 In such a case, the government initiates con-
detonation proceedings, condemns the land, and then compensates the
15. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text for discussion of the state's police power.
16. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1165 (1967).
17. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.11. "Authority is... universal in support of the
amplified definition of eminent domain as the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent upon making just compensation." Id. The state's
eminent-domain power is an attribute of state sovereignty. Id. at § 1.141[3]. The power en-
dures as long as the state exists, and state legislatures may not constrict the power in any
manner. Id.
18. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) (citing United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980)). See infra text accompanying note 32 for a definition of inverse
condemnation.
19. 1 . SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.42[2].
20. Id. at §§ 1.3, 1.14[2].
Mhe sovereign power of the state is broad enough to cover the enactment of any law
affecting persons or property within its jurisdiction, and as the taking of property
within the jurisdiction of a state for public use upon payment of compensation is not
prohibited by the constitution.., it necessarily follows it is within the sovereign
power of a state, and it needs no additional justification.
Id. at § 1.13[4].
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
22. The constitutional provisions which provide just compensation only limit the power of
eminent domain and generally do not impose limitations upon valid exercises of the police
power. I J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.42[2].
23. Id. at § 1.22[1]. "The primary object for the exercise of eminent domain in any com-
munity is the establishment of roads." Id.
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landowner for the forced taking.24 An exercise of eminent domain neces-
sarily involves the taking of some proprietary interest.25
B. Police Power
A second power belonging to the state which can affect private-
property rights is its police power. The police power is the power of the
sovereign to regulate property uses on behalf of the public health, safety
and welfare.26 When the state exercises its police power, the owner of
private property may be denied unrestricted use of his or her property if
the present use is deemed injurious to the public welfare.27
A police-power regulation can include, for example, a zoning ordi-
nance that prohibits future operation of an existing factory because pollu-
tants released into the environment pose a harm to a nearby residential
neighborhood. 2 A land use regulation often restricts an otherwise valid
use of property in order to prevent public harm or detriment caused by
its unrestricted use.29
As with the power of eminent domain, the state's police power,
though very broad, is not unlimited. When regulatory legislation de-
prives a landowner of virtually all use and enjoyment of his or her prop-
erty, the regulation may come within the strictures of the law of eminent
domain.3" If a land use regulation goes "too far,"31 it may be declared an
invalid exercise of the state's police power and designated a "regulatory
taking."' 32 A regulation that amounts to a taking involves an invalid ex-
24. See 6 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at §§ 22.01, 24.02 for a general discussion of condem-
nation proceedings. See id. at § 24.25 for a general discussion of attempt to purchase land.
25. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.11. The power of eminent domain "in its irreduci-
ble terms [is]: (a) Power to take, (b) Without the owner's consent, (c) For the public use." Id.
(emphasis added).
26. Id. at § 1.42.
27. Id. at § 1.42[2].
28. "The police power may be loosely described as the power of the sovereign to prevent
persons under its jurisdiction from conducting themselves or using their property to the detri-
ment of the general welfare." Id. The Supreme Court will generally not find a taking when a
land use regulation prohibits an otherwise valid use of land in order to prevent public harm or
detriment. See infra text accompanying note 36 for citations to the "nuisance" cases.
29. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting operation of brickyard
not a taking); infra text accompanying note 36.
30. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.42[l].
31. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 397 (1922).
32. Regulatory takings refer to cases where the state's exercise of its police power, in regu-
lating private uses of property, amount to a taking of property and require the payment ofjust
compensation. When a landowner challenges a land use regulation on the grounds that a
taking has occurred, he or she brings an "inverse condemnation" proceeding. "Inverse con-
demnation is 'a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just com-
pensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been
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ercise of both the police power and the eminent-domain power because it
fails to compensate the landowner for the loss.33
What distinguishes eminent domain from the police power is that
eminent domain involves the taking of private property for public use
while the police power involves regulating private property uses to pre-
vent public harm. 4 When the state exercises its police power, the state is
not appropriating property, but rather regulating the manner in which
private property may be used.3" Thus, in cases involving a state's proper
use of its police power, the Constitution does not require just compensa-
tion since no property is actually taken.
III. TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted several differ-
ent tests to determine when a land use regulation amounts to a taking.
36
The Court, however, has been unable to establish any "set formula" de-
lineating when economic injuries caused by government action must be
designated as takings in the interest of "justice and fairness.' ' 37 In Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,38 the Court introduced a
instituted."' Agins, 447 U.S. at 258 n.2 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257
(1980)).
33. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 1.42[l].
34. Id. at § 1.42.
35. Id. "Laws and regulations of a police nature.., do not appropriate property for
public use, but simply regulate its use and enjoyment by the owner." Id.
36. These tests include: (1) the "physical invasion" or "appropriation" test in which any
physical intrusion by the government will effect a taking; see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946) (direct overflight of government aircraft over chicken farm constitutes a taking);
Pumpelly v. Green Bay, 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (indirect flooding caused by construction of a dam
is a taking); (2) the "nuisance" test, where the government tries to prevent a public harm; see
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibiting operation of sand and
gravel business not a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (cutting down ornamental
cedar trees not a taking); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning regula-
tions for public health, safety and welfare presumed valid and not takings); Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (prohibiting mining coal a taking because totally destroyed
economic value of property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting opera-
tion of brickyard not a taking); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibiting sale of
intoxicating liquors not a taking); and (3) the "severity-of-economic-impact" test, where ad-
vancement of an important public interest may warrant destruction of property rights; see
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (total destruction of value of shipbuilder's lien
constitutes a taking); Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 398; Miller, 276 U.S. at 279; Hadacheck,
239 U.S. at 396; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595-96.
For an excellent discussion of the Court's tests, see Note, FCC v. Florida Power Corp.:
Limiting the Utility of the Loretto Rule, 41 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 1149, 1152-62 (1987); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978).
37. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962)).
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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takings analysis that required a multifactor, case-by-case analysis.
In Penn Central,39 the Court identified three important factors to be
considered when a landowner challenges a land use regulation as a taking
of property. The factors are: (1) the economic impact of the regula-
tion-whether the regulation has interfered with any of the landowner's
distinct, investment-backed expectations, and if so, the extent of interfer-
ence with the use or value of the property;4° (2) the character of the
government's action-whether there has been any physical invasion of
the property by the government;41 and (3) whether a state tribunal has
reasonably concluded that prohibiting the desired use of the land would
benefit the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.42
Under the multifactor approach, the Court analyzes these three fac-
tors to determine whether a land use regulation amounts to a taking of
property. 3 If all of the factors are in the landowner's favor, the Court
will likely find that a taking has occurred.
In Agins v. Tiburon,' the Court announced a two-part test which
39. In Penn Cent., the Court upheld the validity of New York City's Landmark Preserva-
tion Law. Application of the statute prevented the owners of the Grand Central Terminal
from constructing a multi-story office building above the Terminal, which had been designated
a landmark. Id. at 115-16, 138.
The owners brought a lawsuit claiming that application of the Landmark Preservation
Law effected a taking of property. Id. at 107, 119. Penn Central argued that any substantial
restriction imposed on a landowner's ability to develop his or her land was a taking that re-
quired the payment of compensation. Id. at 130.
In rejecting the argument, the Court refused to focus on Penn Central's inability to de-
velop the air rights above the terminal as a compensable property interest. Id. at 130-31.
Rather, the Court considered whether the regulation as applied to the whole building, not just
the area above the terminal, effected a taking of property. Id. The Court upheld the landmark
law because it substantially promoted valid public purposes-enhancing the quality of life and
preserving the aesthetic characteristics of the city-and because application of the law did not
interfere with the present use of the terminal or impair any investment-backed expectations.
Id. at 128-38.
40. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
41. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
42. Id. at 125 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
43. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979), for an application of
Penn Central's multifactor approach.
44. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). InAgins, landowners sued the City of Tiburon for damages and a
declaratory judgment that a zoning regulation, limiting construction of single-family homes,
was unconstitutional. The zoning ordinance limited construction to five single-family homes
on a five-acre tract of land owned by the Agins. Id. at 257.
The Agins Court stated that a regulatory taking is essentially "a determination that the
public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power
in the public interest." Id. at 260. The Court upheld the zoning ordinance because the benefit
to the public outweighed the burden upon the landowners. Id. at 261-62. Therefore, under the
ruling in Agins, where the public benefit from a land use regulation outweighs the private
burden on a landowner, a regulatory taking will not be established. Id.
[Vol. 22:951
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appeared to synthesize the three factors announced in Penn Central. The
Court held that a general zoning law4' will not effect a taking if it: (1)
substantially advances legitimate state interests;" and (2) does not deny
an owner economically viable use of his or her land. 7 By considering
only these two factors, the Agins two-part test abridges the "overall stan-
dard of 'fairness and justice'" embodied in Penn Central's multifactor
approach.
48
In certain situations, the Court may find that the existence of a sin-
gle factor is sufficient to establish a taking. For example, in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,49 the Court held that the charac-
ter of government action alone may be enough to constitute a taking. In
Loretto, the Court stated that "a permanent physical occupation author-
ized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that
it may serve."50 When a "physical intrusion [by government] reaches the
extreme form of a permanent physical occupation," the Court considers
the character of the government action as the determining factor that a
taking has occurred."
Thus, when the character of government action results in any per-
manent physical occupation of land, it will be considered a taking, even if
the occupation is de minimus and does not interfere with other uses of
the landowner's premises.52 In such a case, the Court has held that the
45. Unlike other land use regulations, zoning regulations are presumptively valid as long
as they bear a substantial relationship to the public welfare and do not inflict irreparable injury
on the landowner. Id. at 260-61 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
46. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
47. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)).
48. Freillich & Morgan, 10 ZONING & PLANNING LAW REPORT 169, 170 (Dec. 1987)
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). See Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242-51 (1987) for an application of
the Agins two-part test.
49. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, a New York law permitted cable television companies
to install cable equipment upon rental property. Id. at 421. The owner of an apartment build-
ing subject to the regulation brought a class action on behalf of all affected owners of real
property, alleging that the installation of cable equipment was a trespass and a taking of prop-
erty without just compensation. Id. at 424.
50. Id. at 426. The Court recognized that the New York law served a legitimate public
purpose by providing valuable educational and community information. Id. at 425. However,
the Court held that even if the regulation was a valid police-power regulation, it may still be a
taking if it impaired essential property rights. Id.
51. Id. at 426. The Court's per se takings rule was based on historical notions of property
rights. Id. at 435. Whenever the government permanently and physically occupies property, it
destroys the three essential property rights-the rights "'to possess, use and dispose.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
52. Id. at 430. Once a permanent physical occupation is established, the Court will find
that a taking has occurred, and only then will it look to the extent of physical occupation by
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normal multifactor analysis of Penn Central does not apply.5 3 Instead,
the Court has effectively pronounced that permanent physical occupa-
tions by the government are to be viewed as per se takings. 4
In a recent case, the Court determined that damages are available
for a "temporary" taking.55 In First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles,56 landowners claimed that application
of a flood-control ordinance denied them all use of their property57 and,
accordingly, they sought damages for the uncompensated taking of their
property. 8 The Court held that damages are available for a temporary
taking from the time an invalid regulation is enforced against a land-
owner until the regulation is judicially declared a taking of property. 9
First English thus stands for the proposition that a landowner may re-
cover damages for the period during which an invalid land use regulation
resulted in a taking of property.' However, a landowner must show that
he or she has been "denied .. .all use of [his or her] property for a
the government to determine the amount of compensation owed to the landowner. Id. at 431.
The extent of occupation is irrelevant to the initial question of whether there is a taking.
53. Id. at 426. In cases which do not involve a permanent physical occupation by govern-
ment, the Court affirmed that the proper analysis would be the multifactor approach of Penn
Central. Id.
54. Id.
55. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2381 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2384. The Court held that in cases "where the government's activities have
already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective." Id. at 2389. The Court limited the damages remedy to cases where a landowner
was denied all use ofproperty. Id. However, the damages remedy would not be available to a
landowner who was denied all use of land because of "normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like." Id.
The Court remanded the case to the California Court of Appeal for a determination of
whether the flood control ordinance actually effected a taking of property by denying the land-
owners "all use of [their] property." Id.
58. Id. at 2382.
59. Id. at 2388. In four previous decisions, the Court was unable to consider the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy for a temporary taking of property because of various procedural
defects. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (issue of
taking or remedy not reached without final determination by local government on application
of its land use regulation); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985) (inverse condemnation claim not yet ripe for review until local govern-
ment agency rendered final decision on landowner's development application); San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (remedies for taking not considered due to lack
of "final judgment or decree" on actual taking); and Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
(Court refused to evaluate economic impact of zoning ordinance until landowner submitted
development proposal to local officials).
60. First English, 107 S.' Ct. at 2389.
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considerable number of years"6 1 before the damages remedy will be
available.62
In sum, the Supreme Court has identified several methods to evalu-
ate a takings claim. The Court may look to the state's interest in the
regulation, the economic impact on the landowner and whether there has
been any physical invasion by the government.63 If there has been a
physical invasion by the government, the Court may declare a per se
taking without looking to the state's interest or to the economic impact
on the landowner."4 Finally, where a government regulation has been
declared a taking by a court of law, the landowner may be entitled to
damages for the period during which the regulation denied the land-
owner all use of his or her land.65
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,66 the Court considered
whether, under the two-part test announced in Agins, there needed to be
a particular connection between the state's interest and the regulation
imposed, such that the regulation substantially advanced that state inter-
est. The following section discusses the Court's treatment of a takings
claim under the Agins two-part test.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
James and Marilyn Nollan owned a beachfront lot with a small 504
square-foot bungalow 67 in Ventura County, California. 68 The property
was flanked on both sides by public beaches, Faria County Park located a
quarter-mile to the north, and an area popularly known as "the Cove"
located 1,800 feet directly to the south.69 A concrete seawall separated
the beach portion of the Nollans' property from the rest of their lot.70
The historic mean high tide set the lot's oceanside boundary.71
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S at 124-25.
64. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
65. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
66. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan II].
67. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143 (1987) [Nollan II].
68. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987) (No. 86-133). The Nollans' lot was part of a residential subdivision. Id.
69. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
70. Id. The dry sandy beach area extended over one-third of the Nollans' property. Ap-
pellant's Opening Brief at 3, Nollan II (No. 86-133).
71. See 2 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, at § 5.33[5]. There are three types of land in which
issues involving the public's right of access to the sea may arise. The first is the area seaward
from the mean low tide line and is owned entirely by the sovereign. Id. The second area is
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The Nollans originally leased their property with an option to
purchase.7 2 The option agreement was contingent upon the Nollans'
promise to demolish the existing structure on the lot, and replace it with
a single-family home to conform with the rest of the neighborhood.73 In
order to construct the improvements, California Public Resources Code
sections 30106, 30212, and 3060074 required that the Nollans obtain a
coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission
(Commission). 7
located between the mean high tide and the mean low tide. This area is known as the foreshore
and is considered to be held in trust by the sovereign for public use. Id. The third area extends
from the mean high tide to the vegetation line. This "dry sand beach" area may be owned by
private owners to the public's exclusion. Id.
72. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
73. Id. The neighborhood was residential with attractive moderate-sized homes. Appel-
lant's Opening Brief at 4, Nollan II (No. 86-133).
74. Section 30106 provides in pertinent part:
"Development" means, on land .... the placement or erection of any solid mate-
rial or structure;... construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the
size of any structure, including any facility of any private, public or municipal utility;
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30106 (West 1986).
Section 30212 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Public access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the
coast shall be provided in new development projects except where (1) it is inconsis-
tent with public safety, military security needs, or the protection of fragile coastal
resources, (2) adequate access exists nearby, or (3) agriculture would be adversely
affected. Dedicated accessway shall not be required to be opened to public use until a
public agency or private association agrees to accept responsibility for maintenance
and liability of the accessway.
(b) For purposes of this section, "new development" does not include
(2) The demolition and reconstruction of a single-family residence; pro-
vided, that the reconstructed residence shall not exceed either the floor area,
height or bulk of the former structure by more than 10 percent, and that the
reconstructed residence shall be sited in the same location on the affected prop-
erty as the former structure.
(3) Improvements to any structure which do not change the intensity of its
use, which do not increase either the floor area, height, or bulk of the structure
by more than 10 percent, which do not block or impede public access, and
which do not result in a seaward encroachment by the structure.
ic)'Nothing in this division shall restrict public access nor shall it excuse the
performance of duties and responsibilities of public agencies which are required by
Sections 66478.1 to 66478.14, inclusive, of the Government Code and by Section 4 of
Article X of the California Constitution.
Id. § 30212. See infra note 170 for text of section 4 of article X of the California Constitution.
Section 30600 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In addition to obtaining any other permit required by law from any local
government or from any state, regional, or local agency, on or after January 1, 1977,
any person wishing to perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone...
shall obtain a coastal development permit....
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30600 (West 1986).
75. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
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B. Procedural History
The Nollans submitted their permit application to the Commission
proposing to demolish the existing bungalow and replace it with a "two-
story, three-bedroom, 1,674 square-foot residence with [an] attached
two-car garage."76 The Commission approved the permit but condi-
tioned its approval upon the Nollans' grant of a public easement across
their property between the mean high tide line and the seawall." The
Commission determined that the easement would allow for greater pub-
lic access to both Faria County Park and the Cove.78
The Nollans filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus79
requesting that the condition be invalidated.80 The Nollans argued that
the Commission could not impose the condition without an evidentiary
showing that the Nollans' proposed development project would work a
direct adverse impact on public access to the beach.81
The California Superior Court for the County of Ventura held that
the Commission failed to demonstrate any potential adverse effects that
might flow from the Nollans' proposed construction.82 Accordingly, the
court remanded the case to the Commission for a "full evidentiary hear-
ing" on whether the Nollans' project would have any direct adverse effect
76. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 721, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28,
29 (1986) [Nollan I].
77. This area was approximately one-third of the Nollans' property. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 5, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (No. 86-133). See
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3143 (1987) [Nollan 11].
79. The California Code of Civil Procedure defines the procedure for a writ of administra-
tive mandamus as follows:
(a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any
final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by
law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion
in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
officer, the case shall be heard by the court sitting without a jury....
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1988).
80. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
81. Id.
82. Id. The trial court's findings included:
1. The Nollans are being required to "dedicate the entire beach, approximately
one-third of the property."
2. The Nollans "are not building a single-family residence on a vacant lot but
rather are replacing a single-family residence with another single-family residence."
3. The Nollans "are not changing the use of the property."
4. "It does not appear that this replacement home is out of character with the other
houses in the area."
5. "[Ihe record does not show at this time that [the new home's] placement on
existing residential private property will burden the public's otherwise available ac-
cess to the beach."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Nollan II (No. 86-133) (quoting Joint Appendix at 37-38).
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on public access to the beach. 3
The Commission held a public hearing and determined that the Nol-
lans' new home would impair the public's ability to view the ocean.
8 4
The Commission's findings were not based on the potential effect of the
Nollans' project standing alone, but rather on the "cumulative impact"
of their project together with other shorefront development.8 5
The Commission found that the Nollans' new house would contrib-
ute to the development of a wall of residential structures which would
impair the public's view of the coastline.8 6 In addition, the new house
would increase private use of the shorefront.8 7 The increased private use
of the shorefront coupled with the cumulative effect of other develop-
ment, would burden public access to the ocean according to the Commis-
sion's findings.88 The Commission also noted that forty-three out of sixty
coastal-development permits granted along the same tract of land had
been similarly conditioned to provide for lateral public access. 89 There-
fore, in order to offset the potential adverse effects of the Nollans' pro-
ject, the Commission upheld the easement condition. 90
The Nollans thereafter filed a supplemental petition for a writ of
administrative mandamus with the superior court.91 They argued that
the condition's imposition violated the takings clause of the fifth amend-
83. Id. at 7; Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143 (citing Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (No. 86-133)).
84. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
85. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, Nollan II (No. 86-133). The Commission's findings
indicated that:
[Tjhe [Nollans'] lot is located along a unique stretch of coast where lateral public
access [is] inadequate due to the construction of private residential structures and
shoreline protective devices along a fluctuating shoreline. At times the wet sandy
beach extends up to both the applicant's and other residents' existing seawalls,
preventing pedestrian passage when the tide is in.... [1]he Commission notes that
there are several existing provisions of pass and repass lateral access benefits already
given by past Faria Beach Tract applicants as a result of prior coastal permit deci-
sions. The access required as a condition of this permit is part of a comprehensive
program to provide continuous public access along Faria Beach as the lots undergo
development or redevelopment. The Commission therefore finds that, pursuant to
the public access policies and specifically Section 30212(a) [see supra text accompa.
nying note 74 for pertinent text of the statute], that adequate public access does not
exist nearby and a deed restriction offer to allow the public pass and re-pass rights is
consistent with both past Commission action and with the site's ability to provide
such access.
Id. at 9-10.
86. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44.
87. Id. at 3144.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3143.
91. Id.
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ment.92 The Nollans asserted that unless the Commission could present
evidence of a definable adverse impact on public access, it could not con-
dition the permit.
93
The superior court ruled in favor of the Nollans solely on statutory
grounds and did not reach the takings claim.94 The court held that the
Commission could impose public-access conditions on coastal develop-
ment permits for the replacement of single-family residences only in
cases where the Commission could show either direct or cumulative ad-
verse impact on public access to the sea.95 The court found the eviden-
tiary basis established by the Commission too speculative and not specific
enough to the Nollans' project.96 Therefore, the Commission's conclu-
sion that the proposed development would create either a direct or cumu-
lative burden on the public's access to the sea could not be supported. 9
The court granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the permit condi-
tion eliminated.9
The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeal. 99
While the appeal was pending, the Nollans, in compliance with the op-
tion agreement, purchased the property and made substantial improve-
ments to the bungalow." ° However, the Nollans did not notify the
Commission of these actions.' °1
The court of appeal reversed the superior court's holding.'02 The
court held that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard for
determining whether the permit could be conditioned on providing ac-
cess. 0 3 Under the court of appeal's reading of the Coastal Act, section
30212 of the Public Resources Code"°4 allowed conditioning coastal de-
velopment permits upon the owner's grant of access even without a
showing of direct or cumulative burden on public access.1
0 5
The court of appeal applied the reasoning of Grupe v. California
92. Id. at 3144.
93. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Nollan II (No. 86-133).
94. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
95. Id.
96. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-11, Nollan II (No. 86-133).
97. Id.; Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
98. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
99. Nollan I, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28.
100. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
101. Id.
102. Nollan I, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
103. Id. at 722-23, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
104. CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE § 30212 (West 1986). See supra text accompanying note 74 for
pertinent text of the statute.
105. Nollan I, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723-25, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
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Coastal Commission.10 6 The Grupe court had held that exactions pursu-
ant to the Coastal Act required only "an indirect relationship between a
proposed exaction and a need to which the development contributes." 107
Under the Grupe court's interpretation of the Coastal Act and Cali-
fornia case law, a coastal-development permit that is conditioned upon
the landowner's grant of public access will be valid as long as the pro-
posed development would contribute indirectly to the public's need for
beachfront access.10 8 The Grupe court determined that any project that
indirectly burdened access could validly be conditioned to provide public
access. 109
Relying on the reasoning in Grupe, the court of appeal, in Nollan,
held that as long as the Commission could show that the cumulative
impact of the project in conjunction with other shorefront development
indirectly contributed to the public's need for access, the imposition of an
access condition would be valid.110 Thus, the court reversed the superior
court's grant of the writ of mandamus and held that the Commission's
imposition of an access condition under section 30212 would be valid
even if the project did not directly create the need for access. 1" The
court of appeal also ruled against the Nollans' takings claim.
11 2
The California Supreme Court denied the Nollans' petition for re-
view.113 The Nollans appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, 4 raising the constitutional issue of whether the Commission's
106. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1986).
107. Id. at 166, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589; see also Associated Home Builders of the Greater
East Bay v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971);
Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1985).
108. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 163-67, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 587-90.
109. The facts in Grupe clearly met the indirect-burden test.
[The] beach front home is one more brick in the wall separating the People of Cali-
fornia from the state's tidelands. Although... [the] home alone has not created the
need for access to the tidelands fronting... [the] property, it is one small project
among a myriad of others which together do severely limit public access to the tide-
lands and beaches of this state, and therefore collectively create a need for public
access. Thus, the condition exacted to facilitate access is related to a need to which
... [the] project contributes, even though standing alone, it has not created the need
for access.
Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (footnote and citations ommitted).
110. Nollan I, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723-25, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 722-23, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31. The court applied the identical takings analysis
of the Grupe court and ruled that the easement condition did not deprive the Nollans of all
reasonable use of their property. Thus, the condition was a valid regulation of property. Id. at
723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30; see also Grupe, 166 Cal. App 3d at 174-77, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
113. Id. at 725, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
114. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) which
provides in pertinent part:
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imposition of the access condition effected a taking of property in viola-
tion of the fifth and fourteenth amendments."
15
The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal.
116
The Court held that the imposition of the access condition was an invalid
exercise of the state's police power because the condition failed to satisfy
the requisite connection with a legitimate state interest." 7 The condition
failed to satisfy an "essential nexus" with the state's purpose for condi-
tioning the development, and thus failed to substantially advance a legiti-
mate state interest. 1 8
The Court ruled that the Commission could not constitutionally re-
quire the Nollans to grant the access easement as a condition to a devel-
opment permit due to the lack of an essential nexus." 9 Under the
Court's holding, the only way California could legitimately obtain an
easement across the Nollans' property would be to exercise its power of
eminent domain by condemning the property and compensating the Nol-
lans for the taking.'20
V. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Court used a three-step approach in concluding that the ease-
ment condition imposed on the Nollans amounted to a taking of prop-
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity....
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (amended 1988).
115. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. The constitutional questions presented to the Court
were:
(1) Where the Nollans' proposal to rebuild their private residence on the same site as
a previous house did not create the public's need to use the adjacent beach, does the
requirement that they dedicate a public right-of-way across all of their private beach
and allow the physical invasion of one-third of their property by the public at large
constitute a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
(2) Where a state statute authorizes the exaction of a public right-of-way as a condi-
tion on the approval of a coastal development permit, must the state courts evaluate
the facts of each case to determine whether the burdens imposed on the individual
property owner would constitute a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Appellant's Opening Brief at i, Nollan II (No. 86-133).
116. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
117. Id. at 3148.
118. Id. at 3148-50. The Court recognized California's right to prohibit development that
impaired legitimate state interests, as long as the landowner was not deprived of all viable use
of his or her land. Id. at 3147.
119. Id. at 3150.
120. Id.
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erty.121 First, the Court identified two circumstances where government
action clearly results in a taking of property: (1) any exercise of the
power of eminent domain; and (2) any "permanent physical occupation"
of private property by government itself or by others pursuant to govern-
ment regulation.12 2 The Court recognized that had the permit condition
that was imposed on the Nollans been imposed outright, rather than as a
condition to the permit, it would have certainly constituted a taking
under either theory.
1 23
The Court next sought to determine whether imposing the condition
as an exercise of the police power would alter the finding that a taking
had occurred.12 4 The Court recognized that the state clearly had the
power to prohibit development of any beachfront property, and could
deny the issuance of a development permit outright, as long as there was
a valid purpose for the denial. z12  To be a valid exercise of the state's
police power the regulation must: (1) substantially advance legitimate
state interests; and (2) not deny an owner economically viable use of his
or her land.
1 26
Finally, the Court determined that the Commission's greater power
to deny the permit necessarily included the lesser power to condition the
same permit, as long as the condition imposed served the same legitimate
end as the prohibition on development itself 1 27 It was the failure to sat-
isfy this last requirement-the requirement of an "essential nexus"-that
rendered the easement condition that was imposed on the Nollans an
invalid exercise of the police power, and thus, a taking of property with-
out just compensation.
128
A. Eminent Domain and Permanent Physical Occupation
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reviewed basic eminent do-
main principles and the rule of Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp.
129
Regarding eminent domain, the Justice stated that if the Commission
had required the Nollans to grant outright an easement for public access
across their property, there clearly would have been a taking of property
121. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145-50 (1987) [Nollan II].
122. Id. at 3145.
123. Id. at 3145-46.
124. Id. at 3146-47.
125. Id. at 3146.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3148.
128. Id. at 3148-50.
129. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
[Vol. 22:951
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requiring the payment of compensation. 130 The Court observed that
"one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that
the government be able to require [necessary] conveyance[s],... so long
as it pays for them." ''
In addition to noting that there is a taking whenever government
exercises its eminent-domain power, the Court restated the Loretto rule
for cases involving public easements. 32 In Loretto, the Court held that a
permanent physical occupation by the government, or by others pursuant
to a government regulation, is a taking per se, thus obviating the need for
judicial balancing of possible public benefits or economic impact to the
landowner resulting from the regulation.1
33
Tailoring the Loretto rule to the facts of the case before it, the Court
stated:
[A] "permanent physical occupation" has occurred... where
individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass
to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be trav-
ersed, even though no particular individual is permitted to sta-
tion himself permanently upon the premises.'
34
Justice Scalia reasoned that the public-access easement impaired "'the
right to exclude [others ... ], "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' "9135
The Court, accordingly, concluded that had the Commission imposed
the easement outright upon the Nollans, there would have been a perma-
nent physical occupation, and thus, a taking under Loretto.
136
In sum, the Nollan Court held that under either an eminent-domain
theory or under the Loretto rule there would have been a taking had the
Commission imposed the public-access easement outright upon the Nol-
lans' property.' 37 The Court next considered whether requiring that the
Nollans grant an easement as a condition to their development permit,
would alter the determination that a taking had occurred.'
38
130. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) [Nollan II].
131. Id. An "appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's premises... consti-
tute(s) [a] taking of a property interest." Id.
132. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
133. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 ("a permanent physical occupation authorized by government
is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve"). See supra notes 49-54 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Loretto.
134. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
135. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982), quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3146-48.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
B. The Commission's Power to Deny the Permit
The Court acknowledged that the Commission had the power to
prohibit development on beachfront property as long as the prohibition
would: (1) substantially advance legitimate state interests; and (2) not
deny the landowner all economically viable use of his or her land.139 In
order for a land use regulation to be a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power, both requirements must be satisfied. In Nollan, the
Court did not reach the second prong of the test because the easement
condition failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 
14
0
As part of its analysis of permissible state interests, the Court identi-
fied a "broad range of governmental purposes and regulations"'41 that
might satisfy the requirement that the regulation substantially advance
the government purpose. The Court assumed, for purposes of the Nol-
lans' case, that California had three legitimate state interests to ad-
vance:' 42 (1) protecting the public's right to see the public beaches; (2)
overcoming the public's "psychological barrier" to using the public
beaches; and (3) preventing congestion on the public beaches.'43
C. The Commission's Power to Condition the Permit
The Court held that if the Commission could have shown that the
Nollans' project would impair any of the identified interests, then the
project could be prohibited unless the denial amounted to a taking.
144
The Court asserted that the Commission's greater power to prohibit de-
velopment would necessarily include the lesser power to impose a condi-
tion on the same project, as long as the prohibition and the condition
both served the same end. 1
45
Assuming that protecting the public's view of the ocean was a valid
139. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 (1987) [Nollan I]. The
Court applied the Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), two-part test: "The application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land." Id. at 260 (citation omitted). See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Agins.
140. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3147-48.
141. Id. at 3147 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980) (scenic zoning); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (landmark preservation); Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1962) (residential zoning)).
142. Nollan 1I, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
143. Id.
144. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1987) [Nollan II].
145. Id. The Court held that "a permit condition that serve[d] the same legitimate police
power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit should not be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking." Id.
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purpose for the Commission to pursue, the Court stated that any land
use condition that actually protected the public's view of the ocean, such
as a height limitation on structures or fences, would be a valid condi-
tion.1 46 Even a requirement that the Nollans "provide a viewing spot on
their property for passersby with whose [view] of the ocean [the Nollans']
new house would interfere" would be valid. 47 The conditions would be
valid because they served the same purpose as the Commission's pur-
pose-protecting the public's ability to view the beach"4 -- even though
those conditions imposed outright would have constituted a taking of
property. 149
1. The essential-nexus test
The Court held that the Commission's power to impose virtually
any condition on development was not unlimited; 5 ' rather, in order for
the condition to be valid, it must bear an "essential nexus" to a legitimate
state interest.' 5' The Court suggested that the requirement of an essen-
tial nexus between a legitimate state interest and the condition must be
present whenever a state seeks to impose a condition that would amount
to a taking if imposed outright.5 2 The justification for the nexus require-
ment in such cases is the constitutional requirement that just compensa-
tion be paid for the taking of property. 53 The Court stated:
The evident constitutional propriety [for the imposition of con-
ditions] disappears... [when] the condition substituted for the
prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justi-
fication for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is elimi-
nated,... the original purpose of the building restriction...
becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve
146. Id. at 3147-48.
147. Id. at 3148.
148. Id. at 3147-48.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3146-48.
151. Id. at 3148. The Court gave the following example of a condition that failed to have
an essential nexus with a legitimate state interest:
[Assume that a state] law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but granted
dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. While a ban
on shouting fire can be a core exercise of the State's police power to protect the public
safety, and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of speech, ad-
ding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which, while it may be legiti-
mate, is inadequate to sustain the ban. Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring
a $100 tax contribution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than an
outright ban, it would not pass constitutional muster.
Id.
152. Id. at 3148, 3150.
153. Id. at 3150.
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some valid government purpose, but without payment of com-
pensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of "legitimate
state interests" in the takings and land use context, this is not
one of them. In short, unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the build-
ing restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but "an out-
and-out plan of extortion." '154
The essential-nexus test ensures that when states impose conditions on
development that would effect a taking if imposed outright, the condition
complies with constitutional standards.
2. Application of the essential-nexus test
The Commission argued that the Nollans' project would interfere
with "visual access" to the beach, thus creating a "psychological barrier"
to access.15 5 The cumulative effect of the project with other shorefront
development would also contribute to the need for more "access." ' 6
The burdens on the different kinds of access would be alleviated, it was
argued, by imposing an easement to provide "lateral access" across the
Nollans' private beachfront property which separated two public
beaches.
157
By closely analyzing the Commission's argument, the Court con-
cluded that the condition failed to satisfy an essential nexus with a legiti-
mate interest. 58 The Commission argued that a wall of houses
completely blocked the view of the beach and a person looking from the
road would not be able to see any portion of the beach. 15 9 Therefore, an
154. Id. at 3148 (emphasis added) (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584,
432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22 & n.20, Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (No. 86-133); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 (1982)). In a footnote, the Court stated:
One would expect that a regime in which this kind of leveraging of the police power
is allowed would produce stringent land use regulation which the State then waives
to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land use goals pur-
portedly sought to be served than would result from more lenient (but nontradeable)
development restrictions. Thus, the importance of the purpose underlying the prohi-
bition not only does notjustijy the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating
the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice.
Id. n.5 (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at 3149.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court stated: "It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollan's property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house." Id.
159. Id. at 3143. The majority rejected Justice Brennan's interpretation of the Commis-
sion's argument that:
[Vol. 22:951
April 1989] RESTRICTIONS ON LAND USE CONDITIONS 971
easement would be needed to offset the impairment of the oceanview
caused by the Nollans' project and to provide the public with lateral ac-
cess between the two beaches. The Court stated, however, that the lat-
eral-access easement would only be used by people who were already
situated on these beaches, and that consequently, the potential impair-
ment of the oceanview caused by the Nollans' project would have abso-
lutely no effect upon their access to the public beaches.'" Since the
lateral-access condition was to provide access for people already on the
beach, there was clearly no connection between the condition imposed by
the Commission and the potential impairment of the oceanview that was
to be created by the Nollans' project.
The Court stated that its finding of a lack of an essential nexus
under the facts in Nollan was "consistent with the approach taken by
every other court that has considered the question, with the exception of
the California state courts." 
161
D. The Majority's Conclusion
The Court ended its analysis of the Nollans' taking claim by recog-
nizing that the Commission had the right to advance its "comprehensive
program" of regulating development of the shorefront, but only if it com-
plied with the essential-nexus requirement.16 2 An essential-nexus re-
quirement ensures that when the state imposes a condition that would
amount to a taking if imposed outright, the state's real purpose will be to
further a valid public interest, rather than to avoid paying just compensa-
tion for the taking of property. 163
The Court's opinion can be summarized as follows: When a state
seeks to impose a land use condition that would amount to a taking if
[A] person looking toward the beach from the road will see a street of residential
structures... and conclude that there is no public beach nearby. If, however, that
person sees people passing and repassing along the dry sand behind the Nollans'
home, he will realize that there is a public beach somewhere in the vicinity.
Id. at 3150.
160. Id. at 3149, 3150.
161. Id. at 3149 (emphasis added). The Nollan Court cited a number of cases supporting
the conclusion that the Commission failed to establish an essential nexus between the condition
imposed and the interest to be advanced by the condition. Id.
162. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987) [Nollan II].
163. Id. at 3148. The Court stated:
[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the
police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate State interest. We are in-
clined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of
property is made a condition to the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power objective.
Id. at 3150 (emphasis in original).
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imposed outright, the condition must bear an "essential nexus" to a legit-
imate state interest in order to be valid. 1 In other words, the condition
imposed must actually further the same end as the state's purpose for
imposing the condition, such that the latter is substantially advanced by
the former. The failure to establish an essential nexus will render the
condition a taking of property. 165 The state can then only effectuate its
purpose by exercising its eminent-domain power and compensating the
landowner for the property taken.
1 66
E. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, argued that
the majority imposed "a degree of exactitude" that was inconsistent with
the Court's usual standard for reviewing exercises of the state's police
power. 67 He stated that the state's police power "demand[ed] only that
the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective."
' 161
Applying this deferential standard of review, Justice Brennan re-
jected the majority's "narrow conception of rationality."' 169 He criticized
the majority's "essential-nexus" requirement by stating that "[tihe
Court's insistence on a precise fit between the forms of burden and condi-
tion on each individual parcel along the California coast ... penalize[s]
the Commission['s] ... flexibility, [and] hamper[s] the ability to fulfill its
public trust mandate." 70
Justice Brennan then argued that even if the majority's essential-
nexus test was the appropriate standard to apply, the regulation in Nol-
lan satisfied its more stringent requirements.1 71 He argued that the "lat-
164. Id. at 3146-48.
165. Id. at 3150.
166. Id.
167. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3151 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) [Nollan II].
168. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (emphasis in original)).
169. Id. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that article X of the California
Constitution protected the public's expectation of adequate access to the ocean from impair-
ment by private landowners. The majority strongly rejected this argument. Id. at 3145-46.
Article X, § 4 of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No individual
... possessing the frontage ... of... navigable water in this state, shall be permitted to
exclude the right of way to any such water.... ." CAL. CONsT. of 1879, art. X, § 4 (amended
1986).
171. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3154-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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eral-access condition" alleviated the impression that the beaches located
behind the "wall of homes" were solely for private use 7 2-- an argument
strongly rejected by the majority.
173
The second argument advanced by Justice Brennan dealt with the
disposition of the Nollans' takings issue. He noted that even if the regu-
lation was a legitimate exercise of the police power, it must satisfy a sepa-
rate takings analysis.'14 Under his analysis, the regulation would create
only minimal physical intrusion, minimal diminution in value, and would
not impair any investment-backed expectations. 1 7  He concluded that
under the multifactor approach of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,176 the regulation did not constitute a taking.1 77
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by admonishing the majority
for ignoring state agencies' need for considerable flexibility in responding
to the problems associated with development along the shorefront. 178
Justice Brennan asserted that rather than impeding coastal conservation,
the Court should encourage necessary regulation along the shorefront.179
He found that the majority ruling accomplished the opposite result with
"reasoning... hardly suited to the complex reality of natural resource"
preservation. 180 Justice Brennan expressed his hope that a "broader vi-
sion" would ultimately prevail. 8 ' He felt that "States should be afforded
considerable latitude in regulating private development, without fear that
their regulatory efforts will often be found to constitute a taking,"' 182 thus
chilling necessary regulation of the public beaches.
2. Justice Blackmun
Justice Blackmun dissented on the grounds that the majority's bene-
fit-burden nexus requirement impeded the adoption of "creative solu-
tions" to solve serious land use problems. 83 He agreed with Justice
172. Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 3149.
174. Id. at 3156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 3156-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. 438 U.S. 104 (1970).
177. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 3162 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Brennan, ., dissenting).
180. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Id. n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also reaffirmed his position in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) that
when a "regulatory taking" has been judicially established, the appropriate remedy is mone-
tary damages. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 3162 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's
discussion of the public-trust doctrine. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id. at 3145-46 for
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Brennan that "a State's exercise of its police power need be no more than
rationally based." '184
Justice Blackmun stated that "[c]oastal development by its very na-
ture makes public access to the shore generally more difficult." ' He
suggsted that the diminished visual access to the ocean created by devel-
opment could be offset by imposing conditions on access. 186
Finally, Justice Blackmun applied Penn Central's multifactor ap-
proach, concluding that the regulation did not effect a taking.187 He rea-
soned that there was no diminution in value or impairment of
investment-backed expectations since the Nollans had sufficient notice of
the easement condition before they purchased the property.'88
3. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, cautioned against the
negative implications that the majority's holding in Nollan could have on
future land use planning when read together with First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 189 where the Court per-
mitted a landowner to recover damages for a temporary taking.190
Justice Stevens reasoned that Nollan and First English together may lead
to an "unprecedented chilling effect.., on public officials charged with
the responsibility for drafting and implementing regulations designed to
protect the environment and the public welfare." 191 Justice Stevens be-
lieved that the public interest would best be served by encouraging flexi-
ble and creative solutions to problems caused by private development.' 92
Justice Stevens worried that land use planners would adopt less flexible
approaches due to the potential application of First English's damages
remedy and the essential-nexus requirement of Nollan.193
the majority's rejection of Justice Brennan's public-trust doctrine argument. See supra note
170 and accompanying text for Justice Brennan's discussion of the public-trust doctrine.
184. Id. at 3162-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
185. Id. at 3163 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)).
190. See supra notes 55.62 for a discussion of First English.
191. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 3163-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. Application of Heightened Scrutiny
The most significant aspect of Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion 194 is the Supreme Court's requirement that a land use condition
must satisfy an essential nexus with the state's purpose for imposing the
condition. 195 The Nollan Court applied heightened judicial scrutiny'96 to
invalidate an easement imposed as a condition to a coastal development
permit.197 To comply with constitutional standards, a regulation of the
type involved in Nollan must have a legitimate purpose and must sub-
stantially advance that purpose. 198
Nollan may be interpreted broadly to suggest that all future land use
regulations must bear an essential nexus between the regulation and the
state interest such that the former substantially advances the latter.199 A
broad reading of Nollan will require courts to apply heightened scrutiny
to all land use regulations enacted under the state's police power. To
pass the heightened level of judicial scrutiny, all land use regulations
would, therefore, have to satisfy an essential nexus with a legitimate state
purpose in order to be a valid police-power measure."
Such a broad reading of Nollan would make it considerably easier
for landowners to challenge land use regulations as invalid exercises of
the state's police power, because the state would be compelled to meet a
much higher burden than under rational-basis review. Under the ra-
tional-basis standard, the state would only need to show that a rational
legislature might have thought that it would be reasonable to impose the
land use regulation in order for the regulation to be valid.20' In compari-
son, a heightened scrutiny standard would require the state to prove that
the land use regulation "substantially advances legitimate state interests"
194. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan I1].
195. Id. at 3146-50.
196. See Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 449, 455-57 (1988). Under heightened judicial scrutiny, a court presumes that a regula-
tion is unconstitutional and requires proof that the regulation effectively serves a valid govern-
ment purpose. Id. at 452.
197. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3149-50.
198. Id. at 3146-50. The Court never reached the second part of the Agins test-whether
the regulation denied the Nollans' all use of their land. Id. at 3146 (citing Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
199. See Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Ap-
proaches, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 335, 338, 357 (1988); Falik & Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-
The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View from California,
39 HASTINGS L. J. 359, 378 n.111, 390-91 (1988).
200. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
201. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
April 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in order to be valid.20 2
B. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
A more careful reading of Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,20 a however, suggests that not all land use regulations must satisfy an
essential nexus by substantially furthering legitimate state interests.
Rather, Nollan's essential-nexus requirement should only apply in cases
where the state imposes a land use condition that would effect a taking if
imposed outright. Under this limited reading of Nollan, land use regula-
tions that condition government benefits upon the landowner's relin-
quishment of "one of the essential sticks in the bundle of [property]
rights" 2 --such as the right to exclude others-must satisfy an "essen-
tial nexus" with a legitimate state interest. In such cases, the failure to
satisfy the nexus requirement would render the condition an illegitimate
exercise of the state's police power.
The facts of Nollan fully support this narrower interpretation. The
Court held that had the Commission required the Nollans to convey the
easement outright, rather than imposing the easement as a condition to a
development permit, there would have been a taking under either the
Loretto rule or under eminent-domain principles.20 5
The Court in Nollan stated that: "We are inclined to be particularly
careful.., where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition
to the lifting of a land use restriction .... [I]n that context there is
heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation require-
202. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added). If all future land use regulations will
be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, then property rights will be elevated to the status of
a "quasi-fundamental" right and be entitled to the same standard of review accorded gender
and illegitimacy classifications in equal protection cases. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265
(1978) ("classifications based on legitimacy [must be] ... substantially related to permissible
state interests"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives").
Application of heightened scrutiny to property rights would lead to the same confusion
that the Court generated with Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978),
when the Court elevated contract-based property rights to the status of a quasi-fundamental
right. Id. at 244-51. The Court later retreated from its position in Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462
U.S. 176 (1983), by holding that contract-based property rights were not subject to heightened
scrutiny.
203. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan II].
204. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
205. Nollan 1I, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. See supra notes 129-38 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of eminent domain and the Loretto rule in Nollon.
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ment, rather than the stated police power objective."2 6 The risk that the
state's motive is the "avoidance of compensation" can only arise when
the state's action would seek to obtain by a condition what it could not
obtain outright without resorting to the use of eminent domain.2 "7 An
essential-nexus requirement for conditions that would effect a taking if
imposed outright ensures that, when government exacts a valuable prop-
erty interest as a condition to the grant of a benefit, the state's purpose
will actually be to benefit the public.
Furthermore, the narrow interpretation of Nollan complies with the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.20 8 Even though states have
broad power to impose conditions on the grant of government benefits,
20 9
the Supreme Court has held that a state may not impose "any unconstitu-
tional conditions on the grant of a privilege. ' 210 The state imposes an
unconstitutional condition when a condition to the receipt of a govern-
ment benefit forces the receipient to relinquish a constitutional right21"
such as when a condition imposed on a development permit forces a
landowner to forego the payment of just compensation for the taking of
property in order to receive the permit.
In Nollan, the Court determined that imposing the easement out-
right clearly would have resulted in a taking of property.212 Thus, when
the Commission conditioned the Nollans' development permit on their
agreeing to grant the public an access easement across their property, the
Commission violated the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The
206. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3150 (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, a state may not impose any condi-
tions on the grant of a government benefit, which imposed outright would force the relinquish-
ment of a constitutional right. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1962) (citing Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)) ("conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they
so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms").
The Nollan Court avoided discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by
stating, in a footnote, that the permit sought by the Nollans did not qualify as a government
benefit. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2 ("the right to build on one's own property-even
though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements--cannot remotely
be described as a 'governmental benefit' "). See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
209. See Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3147-48 for a general discussion of state power to impose
conditions in the land use context.
210. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 657-58
(1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1963); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 191-92 (1952); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 599
(1926)).
211. See id.
212. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
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condition imposed by the Commission violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against taking property for public use without just compensation.
The imposition of the access condition to the grant of a development
permit forced the Nollans to relinquish their constitutional right to just
compensation for an easement over their private beachfront, and was,
therefore, unconstitutional.
After the Court declared that the condition would have been a tak-
ing of property if imposed outright, it then held that the Commission
could not avoid the payment of compensation unless the condition satis-
fied an essential nexus with a valid state purpose.213 The Court stated
that applying heightened judicial scrutiny2"4 is particularly warranted
when the state's real purpose for imposing the condition might be the
exaction of a valuable property interest without paying compensation to
the landowner.215
Accordingly, Nollan's requirement of an essential nexus in the land
use context should be limited to situations where the government im-
poses a condition that would amount to a taking if imposed outright.
The nexus requirement in that situation ensures that the state has a valid
public purpose when it imposes conditions, and if not, it will have to pay
the landowner just compensation for the taking of property.
C. Nollan's Impact on the Imposition of Conditions on Development
If the proposed narrow view of Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission216 is adopted, the only types of land use conditions affected by
the case will be those that amount to a taking of property if imposed
outright, and then only if they fail to satisfy an essential nexus with a
legitimate state interest. Such conditions are most likely to appear in
cases involving required dedications of land or in cases, like Nollan, in-
volving the imposition of easements. Nearly all other types of conditions
on development, such as requiring a developer to pay fees or requiring a
subdivider to provide more parking spaces, would not be subject to Nol-
lan's essential-nexus requirement, and probably could be shown to sat-
isfy the more lenient standard of bearing a rational connection with a
legitimate purpose.
Even if a state imposes a condition that would amount to a taking if
imposed outright, the condition may still be valid if it satisfies an essen-
tial nexus with a legitimate state purpose. For example, assume that a
213. Id. at 3150.
214. See supra text accompanying note 196 for a general discussion of heightened scrutiny.
215. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct at 3150.
216. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan II].
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state requires the dedication of land for a park as a condition to the grant
of a permit to build over vacant land. And further assume that the va-
cant land in question has been used over the years for recreational pur-
poses by neighborhood children. Hence, the state's purpose for imposing
the condition is to provide a park for the neighborhood children to re-
place the lost vacant land.
In such a case, the condition imposed on the grant of a permit-the
dedication of land for a park-may very well bear an essential nexus with
a legitimate state interest-replacement of recreational facilities lost by
construction of the building. Under the Nollan standard, because the
condition imposed satisfies an essential nexus with a legitimate state in-
terest, the condition would be valid even though it would amount to a
taking if it were imposed outright.217
Therefore, the essential-nexus test ensures that when states impose
conditions on development, they must be closely tailored to alleviate ac-
tual burdens caused by a proposed project. If the narrow interpretation
of the case is adopted, then Nollan's impact on the kinds of conditions
that can no longer be imposed under the state's police power will be lim-
ited to cases where: (1) the condition imposed would amount to a taking
if imposed outright; and (2) the condition imposed fails to satisfy an es-
sential nexus with a legitimate state interest.
D. Standards for Conditioning Development
The principles adopted in Nollan clarify, for state courts, the stan-
dard to be used when analyzing conditional land use restrictions as po-
tential takings. 18 Previously, states had used three different standards in
such cases: (1) the reasonable-relationship test;
21 9 (2) the nexus test;220
217. Id. at 3145, 3148.
218. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146-48 (1987) [Nollan II].
219. The reasonable-relationship test placed a burden on the landowner to show that the
required dedication did not relate to public health, safety and welfare. See Associated Home
Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484 P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634
(1971) (subdivision exactions for parks "can be justified on the basis of a general need for
recreational facilities caused by present and future subdivision"); Ayres v. City Council, 34
Cal. 2d 31, 38-39, 207 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1949) (California Supreme Court upheld dedication condi-
tions "reasonably related to the protection of the public health, safety and welfare" and "rea-
sonably related to the potential traffic needs"); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395, 407 (1985) ("The 'scope and extent'
of the easements required by the Commission were 'reasonably related' to one of the principal
objectives of the Coastal Act, which is to provide for maximum access to the coast by all
people of the State."); Bell, California Opens the Door for Municipalities to Obtain Greater
Revenue From Subdivision Exactions, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 345, 349-59 (1987).
For application of the reasonable-relationship test to required dedications of beachfront
access, see Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 254-61,
April 1989]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:951
and (3) the specifically-and-uniquely-attributable test.221 In Nollan, the
Court seems to have adopted a middle-ground approach. The majority's
ruling in Nollan clearly showed disfavor for the reasonable-relationship
test applied by California courts.222 A majority of the Court suggested
that applying the reasonable-relationship test to conditions on develop-
ment that would amount to a taking if imposed outright, did not ade-
quately protect a landowner's interests from government intrusion.223
Thus, Nollan is an attempt by the Court to force all jurisdictions to com-
ply with, at minimum, the essential-nexus standard in cases involving the
imposition of conditions on development.
Such an intent is evident in the Court's examination of the connec-
tion between the easement condition and the state's purposes for impos-
ing the condition. The Court found it "impossible" to understand how a
requirement allowing people already on public beaches to walk across the
Nollans' property would reduce any obstacle to viewing the beach, lower
any psychological barrier to using the beaches, or help to remedy any
220 Cal. Rptr. 2, 9-14 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1986) (Coastal Commission's re-
quired dedication of beach access as condition to permit for "new development" only needs to
be reasonably related to one of the Coastal Act's principal objectives); Grupe v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985); Remmenga v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1985). For a discussion of Grupe,
see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
In Remmenga, the California Court of Appeal held that "even if an individual project
does not create an immediate need for a compensating accessway, one may be required of it if
its effect together with the cumulative impact of similar projects would in the future create or
increase the need for a system of such compensating accessways." Remmenga, 163 Cal. App.
3d at 628, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
220. State courts applied the nexus test to ordinances that required subdivision developers
to dedicate land or pay fees for open space or parks as conditions to the grant of development
permits. Bell, supra note 219, at 348. For further discussion of the nexus test, see id. (citing
Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board, 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968) (subdivider can
be "compelled only to bear that portion of the cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs
created by, and benefits conferred upon, the subdivision")).
The nexus test closely resembles the test applied by the Nollan II Court. See Nollan II,
107 S. Ct. at 3148-49. Under the nexus test, a burden created by development-such as loss of
recreational facilities or overcrowding-could be offset by conditioning the project upon the
dedication of land or payment of fees for park facilities or open space. The condition imposed
must substantially relate to the burdens created by the subdivision.
221. The specifically-and-uniquely-attributable test focused on the needs or burdens created
by the proposed subdivision. Bell, supra note 219, at 348. Mandatory dedications were valid
only when the needs created by the project were directly attributable to the project. Id.
The standard required that all conditions be specifically- or narrowly-tailored to alleviate
burdens caused by the development. Id. at 347-48 (citing Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Vil-
lage of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (mandatory dedications as
conditions to subdivision approval must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the sub-
divider's activity)).
222. Nollan II, 107 S. Ct. at 3149-50.
223. Id. at 3150.
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additional congestion on the beaches caused by construction of the Nol-
lans' new house.224 The Court stated:
[T]he Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot
be treated as an exercise of its land use power for any of these
purposes. Our conclusion on this point is consistent with the
approach taken by every other court that has considered the
question, with the exception of the California state courts. 225
Further, the Court found that the easement condition imposed by
the Commission would not even pass California's reasonable-relationship
standard.226 By reversing the California Court of Appeal and rejecting
the long line of California cases which applied a deferential standard of
review to conditions on development, the Court appears to have forced
California to abandon its reasonable-relationship standard and to adopt a
higher standard of review.
The Court in Nollan clearly demonstrated that it would pursue an
active role in measuring benefits and burdens of a land use regulation.
227
Moreover, the Court suggested that it will no longer defer to a state's
declarations of valid public purposes, and that it will apply a higher level
of scrutiny when determining the legitimacy of conditions on develop-
ment that would amount to a taking if imposed outright.228
E. Application of the Essential-Nexus Test
The Court announced that it will examine land use regulations even
more closely when there is a danger that the state's real purpose for con-
ditioning benefits is to avoid the payment of compensation for the grant
of a valuable property interest.229 Such cases normally arise when the
government exacts an easement or requires the dedication of land as a
condition to its approval of a development permit.
In such cases, the Court will require that the condition satisfy a
strict "essential nexus" with a valid police-power purpose to ensure that
the purpose is legitimate. Thus, under the essential-nexus test adopted in
Nollan, the state has the burden of demonstrating that the condition im-
posed actually furthers the state's purpose for imposing the condition.230
224. Id. at 3149.
225. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
226. Id. at 3148.
227. Id. at 3148-50.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 3150.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 196 and 202 for a general discussion of heightened
scrutiny.
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Heightened judicial scrutiny is particularly warranted when the state ex-
acts a valuable interest in land due to the element of the state's self-inter-
est. There is a real danger that the state's real purpose may be to obtain a
property interest in land without the payment of compensation.231
Commentators have suggested that Nollan's essential-nexus test can
be easily satisfied by future development plans, legislative findings and
impact analyses showing that the state's real purpose does satisfy an es-
sential nexus with the condition imposed.232 Thus, concern with the po-
tential "chilling effect" on creative land use planning, expressed by the
dissenters in Nollan, may not be as problematic as originally thought.
However, with the need for a factual showing of an essential nexus
as required by Nollan and the availability of damages for a temporary
taking under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles,233 landowners can be assured that all future conditions on devel-
opment that would effect a taking if imposed outright, will satisfy the
essential nexus required under the Constitution. Nollan's essential-nexus
test ensures that landowners' interests will be safeguarded against viola-
tions of governmental power that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
were designed to protect.234
In the face of an overdeveloped and overburdened shorefront, exac-
tions and dedications can be important tools to ensure that the public
will be able to enjoy an unspoiled ocean view and adequate access to the
public beaches. The government must be able to impose necessary land
use regulations for the public benefit. Public enjoyment of public beaches
and recreational facilities clearly falls within the interests the state may
231. A similar analysis has been used by the Supreme Court for state regulations that im-
pair private contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall enter into any... Law impair-
ing the Obligation of Contracts . . ... "). In analyzing whether the state's impairment of
contracts violates the contracts clause, the Court applies a stricter standard of review for pub-
lic contracts than for privat6 contracts. Stricter scrutiny for public contracts is warranted due
to the state's self-interest. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)
("complete deference to legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropri-
ate [when dealing with impairment of public contracts] because the State's self-interest is at
stake").
Compare Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light, 459 U.S. 400 (1983),
and Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (impairment-of-private-contracts test) with
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 29 (Court's more stringent test for impairment of public
contracts---"reasonable and necessary to serve... important purposes claimed by the State").
232. Marsh & Rosenthal, At Long Last, the Supreme Court Speaks Out On the "Taking"
Issue, Daily Journal Report, February 5, 1988 at 21.
233. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text for a discussion
of First English.
234. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (1971).
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protect. But, when such regulations go "too far, '2 3 5 landowners can be
assured that they will be protected against the imposition of unconstitu-
tional conditions and will be justly compensated for the taking of
property.
A narrow reading of Nollan strikes an equitable balance between the
government's interest in regulating property uses for the public benefit
and the landowner's interest in full enjoyment of his or her property.
Therefore, the requirement of an essential nexus in the land use context
should be limited to cases where a state seeks to impose a condition that
would amount to a taking if imposed outright. Only then is there a dan-
ger that the state's real motive is to obtain by a condition what it could
not obtain outright without resorting to the use of its eminent-domain
power.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,236 the Court applied
heightened scrutiny to a land use condition imposed on a development
permit and declared the condition an invalid exercise of the state's police
power.2 3 7 Under a narrow interpretation of Nollan, all conditions that
would amount to a taking of property if imposed outright must satisfy an
essential nexus with the state's purpose for imposing the condition. 38
Limiting the nexus requirement to such cases ensures both that a state
government will have the necessary latitude to impose important land
use regulations, and that landowners will be protected from an abuse of
governmental power.
Although the Court did not explicitly define the scope of its holding,
a balance between the competing interests of landowners and state gov-
ernments can best be achieved by limiting the essential-nexus require-
ment to conditions on development that would amount to a taking if
imposed outright. Requiring the state to demonstrate an essential nexus
between its purpose and the condition regardless of whether the condi-
tion would be a taking if imposed outright, would unnecessarily impede
the state's ability to impose land use regulations for the public benefit. It
seems unlikely that the Court would establish such a broad ruling with-
out explicitly stating its intention to do so. Therefore, courts should ap-
ply the proposed narrow interpretation of Nollan unless and until the
235. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 397 (1922). See supra notes 29-56 for
a discussion of the Supreme Court's disposition of regulatory takings cases.
236. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) [Nollan II].
237. Id. at 3150.
238. See supra notes 203-17 for a discussion of the narrow interpretation of Nollan.
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Supreme Court explicitly states that all land use regulations must hence-
forth satisfy the close and demanding fit that the essential-nexus test
requires.
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